system of the sort associated with, for example, Germany. In this respect it represents an experiment in comparative business organisation relevant to the broad international business community, and especially to transition economies. The diverse institutional and policy changes which have removed barriers to the development of a takeover market are brought together in the paper.
Second, the different legal forms of takeover are reviewed in their international context -some similar to those in the West, some of them special to China. Measures are provided of the scale of the takeover market for listed companies, its growth and its components: these are hand collected from a wide range of sources.
Third, key characteristics of the Chinese takeover market are analysed against the yardstick of Western markets: the market for corporate control, the role of the state, and the conflicts among stakeholders familiar in the West.
Finally, the paper considers the cross-border takeovers in this market: its new size means that China is potentially one of the biggest sources of targets for international M&A activity as cross-border M&A represents one of the fastest ways for Chinese business to integrate with international business and for foreign bidders to enter the Chinese market. Particular cases are analyzed with regard to the accessibility of the Chinese market to foreign bidders. This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the institutional developments in the Chinese takeover market in an international context, and sets out the historical record. Section 2 analyses the resulting economic characteristics of the domestic Chinese takeover market, against benchmarks from Western markets. And Section 3 views the Chinese market from the perspective of a foreign bidder.
Section 1 The Institutional Background and the Historical Record Milestones in the development of the domestic Chinese stock exchange and takeover market
The Shanghai Stock Exchange opened in December 1990. SOAAB(1992) is the first government policy that stipulated that state-owned shares could be sold to non-state controlled sectors (although the transfer had still to be approved by the government). In practice, however, this led to few cases of the acquisition of state-owned shares in listed companies (LCs) during the early years of the Chinese stock market (see Table 3 below) because the concept of takeover was relatively new to the market and the related regulations created obstacles (see, for example, the caps on private shareholding discussed below).
-Sale of state-owned shares

-Delegation of control of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
CCP(1992) corporatized SOEs, formalising a process begun in 1989 and completed by 2001 of converting SOEs into separate legal entities to conduct management independently and to carry sole responsibility for gains and losses even though the state retains the ultimate ownership and oversight (Li Rongrong, 2002) . This separation of ownership and control has features in common with the separation in the US and UK (Berle and Means, 1932) : control is concentrated in the hands of managers; and they are the prime movers in takeover activity. Owners, whether private shareholders or government, retain an oversight role, with some power to block takeovers initiated by management.
1996-9 -State ownership to be concentrated just on strategic sectors
In the 9th Five-year State Plan, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, 1996) famously stipulated that the strategic way to restructure the SOEs is to "grasp the large and let go of the small". And in the 15th Communist Party Congress held in September 1997, private ownership was formally recognized as an important part of the Chinese Socialist market economy with state ownership reserved for a controlling stake in the key and strategic sectors. The areas chosen for continued state control were subsequently defined by CPC (1999) : national security, natural monopolies, industries providing important public goods and services, pillar and high and new technology industries. SOEs should gradually withdraw from other areas. These policy changes invited the acquisition of SOEs by private investors.
-Promotion of joint stock companies
CPC(1999) also facilitated private ownership in the stock market by stipulating that where the state maintained control, large and medium-sized SOEs should diversify their ownership structure and be transformed into joint-stock companies, with only a few SOEs remaining wholly state-controlled.
-Chinese Securities Law
Crucial to takeover, this Law abolished the 1993 Regulation which limited to just 0.5% the shareholding of any individual in a listed company.
2002-The first Takeover Code
CSRC (2002a) provided a framework for the transfer of shares, including provisions to protect different shareholder groups (see below), and provided rules for valuing those shares which were not traded on the stock market (linking valuations to audited book values). By the time of the second Takeover Code (2006), such rules were unnecessary, as non-tradeable shares were being converted to tradeable ones (see below).
-The reform of non-tradeable shares
One distinctive institutional feature of the Chinese stock market has been the existence of nontradeable shares and the concentration of these shares in the hands of SOEs or other state-owned asset management agencies. This shareholding system has supported the Chinese model of gradually adapting the market mechanism to fit the Socialist economy (Nolan, 1995) . Before the reform of the shareholder structure in the LCs, the "state shares" and "legal person shares", designed in 1992 (SCES, 1992) , were non-tradeable, whereas personal shares are listed and tradeable. State shares are held by the central government, local governments, or solely SOEs, whereas legal person shares are owned by domestic institutions ranging from investment banks, and non-bank financial institutions, to state-controlled enterprises with at least one non-state shareholder. But most legal person shares are state-owned in nature ultimately. And these non-tradable state shares and legal person shares which concentrate ultimately in the hands of the government accounted at their peak for about two-thirds of all the shares of the LCs (see Table 1 ).
CSRC(2005) introduced reforms designed to achieve conversion of these state and legal person shares to tradeable shares. This conversion was to take place over a one-year transition period; and this was succeeded by a lock-up period, which prevented the sudden sale of large blocks of shares: after one year, 5% could be sold, after two years, 10% could be sold. So the barriers to full trading of the sort seen in the West are being dismantled, though the process is still incomplete. (2006) contains Guidelines to promote State-owned capital adjustment and State-owned enterprise restructuring. This reiterated that state-owned capital should further concentrate in the key industries and areas related to national military and economic security, and that the shareholding reform and the restructuring of large-sized SOEs should speed up. Non-state controlled enterprises were encouraged to participate in the process of reorganizing, reforming and rebuilding of SOEs by way of effecting mergers, acquiring controlling shares and holding shares.
-Promotion of merger and acquisition
CSC
The consequences for shareholding
The combined and cumulative impact of these changes has been substantial. comparisons of the ratio of market capitalization to GDP. The precise numbers in this Table have to be treated with caution, especially for years when stock prices were changing rapidly: the capitalization figure is very volatile between years; and even within years there are substantial changes, which explain the differences between China's figures in Tables 1 and 2 : the number can change substantially according to the day on which it is measured. And for that reason we rely chiefly on the three-year average in the final column of Table 2 .This shows Chinese market capitalization at around 100% of GDP -still substantially below the levels of long-standing Western stock market economies such as the US and UK; but similar to China's large Asian neighbours, Japan and India, and much greater than Germany, which has followed a growth path less reliant on the stock market.
Comparing the recent years with 2000 shows limited change for the US and UK, but more than doubling of the ratio for China, reflecting the major policy shifts we have outlined in this section.
In terms of listed companies, the number has grown from zero at the start of the nineteen-nineties to 1608 by July 2009 (SSE, 2009 .
Legal form of acquisition activity; and scale of acquisition activity in modern China
A detailed analysis of the methods of completing acquisitions in China, the relevant regulations, and examples of acquisitions in each category cannot be included here for reasons of space, but is available from the authors. Here we provide a brief summary of the four main methods: shareholder may be insolvent, and the shares may be transferred by a court decision to another organization, with exemption from the normal general offer obligation. In one such example, discussed below, the buyer is a foreign enterprise.
An aside: open market purchases: It is common practice in the US and UK for a bidder to buy the shares of a target directly on the stock exchange without the cooperation of the target -to effect a hostile bid. In China, this practice has been almost impossible, just as it was in Germany until recent years 3 . We have found no cases within our population during this period, and therefore the category is excluded from the tables. Section 2 below explores the reasons for this omission. For the takeovers reported in Panel B of Table 3 , Table 4 provides valuations based on our own calculations of book value from the individual accounts of the participants. On these measures, the same categories dominate the totals. In aggregate, in the peak year for takeover activity in Table 3, 2004, the book value of the acquired listed firms totalled some 1.3% of the market value of all listed companies reported in Table 1 . And this corresponds to some 0.3% of GDP. Now this understates the overall ratio of takeover activity to GDP for two chief reasons. First, the takeover activity is measured at book value rather than market value; and secondly, the takeover activity for our population in Table   3 includes only listed targets. Nevertheless, the figure suggests how small takeover activity still is in China by international standards when compared to Megginson's (2005) estimate that in the takeover peak year of 2000, takeover deals took place globally, which equate to 10% of world GDP.
Section 2 The Resulting Economic Characteristics of the Domestic Chinese Takeover
Market
The market for corporate control
One key function of takeover in the theory of decentralised capitalist economies with active stock markets is to discipline managers who, because of shirking or perks, fail to maximize profits. The principal-agent problem has been well-rehearsed for both socialist economies (Kornai (1986) on the soft budget constraint for managers in state-owned business) and capitalist ones with dispersed, absentee shareholders. Early in the world's first capitalist industrialisation, Adam Smith (1776) identified the agency problem with the joint stock company which China has chosen to copy in its industrialisation:
"The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery [partnership] frequently watch over their own…Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company."
And these problems are known to be more acute, the wider the dispersal of share ownership -another feature of the Chinese transition: the dispersal may exacerbate information asymmetry and increase the free-rider problem in securing the interests of owners. An active takeover market has been seen as a device for mitigating these problems, because it can create incentives to reduce the agency costs. A disciplinary takeover can bring the acquirer substantial benefit: "Share price, or that part reflecting managerial efficiency, also measures the potential capital gain inherent in the corporate stock. The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company more effectively. And the potential return from the successful takeover and revitalization of a poorly run company can be enormous" Manne (1965: 113) . Table 5 examines the financial performance of Chinese takeover targets for evidence that this disciplinary role has been significant in the recent experience of takeover on the Chinese stock exchange. It reports an analysis of the pre-takeover performance of the population of listed Chinese companies which became takeover targets in the years [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The population corresponds almost exactly with that presented in Table 3 Panel B above: just 3 of the 83 companies in Table 3 Panel B had to be excluded because adequate data were not available. Two measures of performance are used, accounting profitability (AP), and cash flow return(CFR), defined respectively as: AP = Pre-tax total profit/average net assets CFR = Operating cash flow/average net assets.
Net assets are defined as total assets minus current liabilities (Meeks, 1977: 79) .
Pre-tax profit is defined as total profit after depreciation, but before tax (Meeks, 1977: 78) .
Operating cash flow is defined as sales minus cost of goods sold, minus selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and goodwill expenses (Healy et al., 1992: 139) .
We use both profitability and cash flow measures to complement each other as both measures are imperfect (see Meeks (1977) and Healy et al. (1992) ). While the pre-tax profitability measure is affected by accrual accounting rules and estimates, operating cash flow measure has the problem of neglecting the expenses related to the capital expenditure used to sustain such operating cash flow returns. Using two measures, we hope to benefit from different perspectives on the operating performance of event firms: inferences supported by both measures will be more robust.
For the Table, the performance measure is then expressed as a difference between the measure for a company in the takeover population and the respective matching company: a comparable listed company matched by industry (Datastream definition) and size (net assets). Thus a positive number in the Table indicates that the takeover target out-performed its match in the respective year, and vice versa. Thus, three years ahead of takeover, median accounting profitability for takeover targets adjusted for the matching firm suggests that the prospective target was typically performing somewhat better than its match; but by the year immediately before the bid, the position had reversed. For the alternative, cash flow return, the matched return was negative in two of the three years as well as in the pooled results for the three years. The median is preferred because of the common problem of outliers with such ratios (Meeks, 1977) . In none of the cases was the performance difference statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10% level with a two-tailed test. So taken together, the lack of unanimity and the lack of statistical significance do not give support to the proposition that the typical target was significantly under-performing ahead of takeover, as the disciplinary takeover hypothesis would suggest.
In this respect, the evidence, and the performance of the market, are consistent with Western studies of the disciplinary takeover hypothesis (e.g. Singh (1975) , Franks and Meyer (1996) , Dickerson et al (2002) ). At first sight, in neither the Western nor the Chinese cases do takeover targets seem on average to perform significantly worse than their peers, as would have been expected if a primary role of the takeover process were to displace under-performing management.
Among the explanations in the Western literature are free-rider problems in the takeover market (Grossman and Hart, 1980) , and the suggestion that, if the takeover deterrent is perfectly effective, then there will be no disciplinary takeovers, because potentially under-performing managers will be deterred from shirking or perks -just as a nuclear deterrent resulted in no nuclear wars (Hannah and Kay (1977) 
A State managed market for corporate control
Although hostile or disciplinary takeover through conventional Western market mechanisms has not been prominent in China, a disciplinary mechanism which utilizes takeover has been deployed.
However, the prime mover has been not a private sector predator, but instead the State. Such a mechanism has not usually been found in Western economies, with exceptions such as the recent banking crisis, where government responses in the US and UK to distressed banks have resembled the process in China.
When confronted with ailing or distressed companies, Chinese stock exchanges stipulated from 1998 that if an LC was loss-making for two consecutive years, it would be in the Special Treatment category (ST) which means it was subject to a 5% daily price limit. In 1999 stock exchanges further stipulated that if a ST LC incurred losses for three consecutive years, it would be transferred to the Particular Transfer category (PT) whose personal shares were traded only on Fridays and were also subject to a 5% daily price limit. And these PT LCs would be de-listed by CSRC if their problems were not solved. To prevent such kinds of situation from happening, the local government owners of the PT LCs were given notice to restructure them. And these owners had the incentive to do so because the listing places of these PT LCs were of great value 5 . Therefore, the state-owned shares of some LCs were transferred to other parties during the restructuring process. As Table 6 shows, non-state-controlled acquirers accounted for only a minority of the takeover activity reported above in Table 3 : for 21 of the 174 acquisitions which gave the buyer at least 30% of shares, and for just 15 of the 83 deals which gave the buyer majority ownership.
As we discussed earlier, this dominance of the State in takeover transactions is reflected in (Liu and Sun, 2005: 48) 6 .
Conflicts among stakeholders -controlling and minority shareholders
Such high concentrations of shareholding present problems familiar from the Western literature (e.g.
La Porta et al. (1999) : are the interests of the minority shareholders protected, or is their wealth 6 Here the pyramid definition is slightly different from that of La Porta et al. (1999:477) who define a firm's ownership structure as a pyramid if it has an ultimate owner who owns at least 20 percent of the voting rights, and there is at least one publicly traded company between it and the ultimate owner in the chain of 20 percent voting rights. (Daye, 2006) . This is because Daye Special Steel Co., Limited had implemented the scheme to convert nontradeable shares into tradeable ones before the general offer was made.
Exemption from making a general offer
The 2002 Tables 3 and 6 ).
In addition, there are also two circumstances in which the offer obligations can be waived to reduce the cost of the transfer of state-owned shares to some private entities or foreign invested enterprises: where the acquirers are non-state controlled, the takeovers are exempted from a general offer obligation and this will encourage the private sector to take part in the takeovers. An example is the rescue case discussed above (Shanghai Forever Co., Limited). In our sample there are 10 cases where non-state controlled enterprises implemented acquisitions and were granted exemption from making a general offer from 1999 to 2005 (see Table 6 ).
Acquisition of the listed shares and the protection of minority shareholders
The regulations on the acquisition of tradeable shares on the open market are relatively similar to those in developed economies. The regulations have specified the regulatory threshold disclosure requirements for takeover to be carried out by open market purchases which we have discussed above.
In particular, the 2006 Takeover Code stipulates that an investor who acquires 5% of a LC must make a public announcement about the change in interests, and that an investor who acquires 20% or more must make a detailed disclosure of its acquisition. And both the old and new Takeover Code also specify the offer price limits. The Takeover Code (2002) stipulates that the general offer price for tradable shares should be no less than the higher of the highest price paid in the preceding six-month period or 90% of the arithmetic average daily weighted trading prices of such listed shares in the past 30 trading days, whereas the Takeover Code (2006) only requires that the offer price not be less than the highest price paid during the past six-month period.
These regulations are intended to protect the interests of the target company and especially those of the tradeable shareholders who are normally minority shareholders of the target before the nontradeable shares reform. However, due to the distinctive institutional features of the Chinese stock market, most takeovers have been implemented by agreement between or among large shareholders with government administrative orders or approvals. Therefore, the acquisition of tradeable shares is not critical: control can be secured without the approval of a majority of the holders of tradeable shares. Even if many takeover bidders have made general offers, normally few tradeable shares have been tendered for sale because the offer prices are not attractive -they did not need to be in order to secure control. In developed economies, historically the offer prices are, on average, 20 or 30% on top of the market price (Jensen, 1986; Jensen, 1988:22; Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001) , whereas in China the price in practice generally was about 90% of the arithmetic average daily weighted trading prices in the past 30 trading days 7 . Thus these regulations do not actually protect the minority shareholders of the target company effectively but reinforce the incentive to effect takeovers by the 7 Calculated for our population of acquirers: most acquirers followed the rules of the Takeover full mandatory bid when a bidder acquires 30% or more of the shares of the target. But in the UK, the offer is usually made contingent on acceptance by 90% or more of shares outstanding, and the offer lapses if less than the stated number of shares is tendered and this type of transaction has characterized the great majority of the UK takeovers of LCs (Franks and Harris, 1989) . However, in
China a general offer can be made by an offeror not to terminate the listing place of an offeree company. If a bidder acquired more than 75%; or, more than 85% when the total share capital of the target exceeded RMB 400 million, the target had to be de-listed. In addition, if a bidder acquired more than 90%, the target has had to change its enterprise form. And in practice most general offers which happened from 2003 to 2005 did not result in mergers but helped the offerors meet the general offer obligations (see Tables 3 and 6 ). Thus the buyer in China can acquire voting control first and then complete a full merger with the target through a freeze-out of the remaining target shareholders if it sees the need to merge and this is somewhat similar to the arrangement in the US under the Williams Act (Raaijmakers, 2002) . The Chinese Takeover Code (2006) will further boost this practice in China because an investor will no longer be required to make a general offer when taking control of LCs.
This may reduce the barriers to takeover, making for a deeper takeover market, but at the cost of less protection of minority shareholders.
Conflicts among stakeholders -target managers and shareholders
In the early years, the regulations were designed to prevent privatizations through takeovers. The 1993 Stock Trading Provisional Regulations stipulated that nobody could hold more than 0.5% of the shares of an LC and the result was to protect LCs from takeover threats. But in order to develop a takeover market, this regulation was abolished in the 1999 Chinese Securities Law. And since then the regulations have been changed gradually in favor of acquirers and some basic rules on takeover defenses have been specified as well.
In China, in response to an offer announced, a target may seek alternative bids from other firms, but cannot take other actions -such as asset disposal, business activities adjustment or other actions that would have a material effect on the target's operating performance -in order to frustrate the bid. It should continue its normal business operations and implement resolutions passed by the shareholders' general meeting. This practice is similar to that in the UK but is quite different from that of the US where a target is permitted a wide range of evasive maneuvers including asset sales, re-capitalization, and restructuring (Bruner, 2004:730-733) . Therefore, these regulations relatively favor bidders in takeover activities and facilitate the transfers of state-owned shares in listed companies. And now targets are becoming more vulnerable to takeover activities as the non-tradeable shares reform is taking effect, and bids via the stock market can take a more prominent role.
But there are some regulations which the targets still can use to protect themselves against takeovers.
For example, in Chinese Company Law, one regulation is that if a merger or division happens, all creditors can demand to be repaid; another is that directors cannot be changed until the expiration of their term if there is no proper reason. In contrast, in most foreign markets such barriers do not exist or do not have serious consequences (Tenev et al., 2002) . Some regulations in the PRC AntiMonopoly Law, which was passed in 2007 and came into effect on August 1 2008 (CPG, 2007) , can be also used to help protect some domestic companies from predators, especially international ones.
For example, if international investors bid for some companies which are involved in national security, then the transactions must be scrutinized by the government
Section 3 The Chinese Takeover Market from the Perspective of a Foreign Bidder
Barriers to the integration of the Chinese and world takeover markets Section 1 outlined the gradual dismantling of barriers to takeover bids on the model of the US and UK markets. Foreign bidders, however, have faced additional barriers, which, until recently, have made it almost impossible for a foreign bidder to gain control of a Chinese LC through share purchases on the stock exchange. Steps have more recently been taken to lower these barriers.
-Foreign access to domestic shares
Prior to 
-Completion of shift to tradeable shares and subsequent lock-up period
Technically, strategic international investors are able to take over a Chinese LC now. According to the
Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investment in Publicly Listed Companies by Foreign
Investors, foreign investors can definitely acquire the shares of a LC by agreement or through the target company's targeted shares issue. But it is not clear whether foreign investors can acquire a LC only by open market purchases. We noted above the policy changes in recent years to convert state and other non-tradeable shares into tradeable ones, and the rising percentage of shares which are tradeable. But we noted the lock-up provisions which will continue to restrict takeover activity. In addition, even after lockup periods, these non-tradable shares, which are tradable after reform, have to be transferred through the block trading systems of stock exchanges if they account for more than 1% of the total issued shares of an LC (CSRC, 2008) . This means that these trades are at every step disclosed to the market; and this may well make it more difficult for international investors to acquire a LC piecemeal, without publicity in the open market, and without provoking counter-bids.
The extent of foreign acquisition activity in China
In practice, there has been very little takeover activity of listed Chinese companies by foreign firms.
The dominant entry mode chosen by foreign investors was to establish international joint ventures before 1997, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises thereafter (Tse et al., 1997; Peng, 2006 ; Puck et al., 2009) (SEB, 2007) . Table 8 isolates the characteristics which distinguish the failed and the successful bids. First, Carlyle's bid predates SEB's by two years, during which, as we have described, the stance of public policy towards takeover generally and foreign takeover in particular, has become more supportive. Second,
Carlyle bid for a state-owned target, SEB for one in the private sector. Third, Carlyle's target was in a sector deemed to be strategic, so the state was reluctant to lose control. Fourth, in the Carlyle case, competition issues were raised by one of the target's rivals in the industry; and this caused delays.
And finally, SEB offered the target's shareholders a premium of 230% over the arithmetic average daily weighted trading prices in the previous 30 trading days (47 yuan versus 14.23 yuan) (Guosen, 2007) ; whereas Carlyle's offer included scarcely any premium. In the West, premia in the range 20%
to 50% are the norm; and in cross border acquisitions, the premium tends to be higher still (Weston et al., 2004) 9 .
The two cases illustrate the special character of the Chinese situation for foreign bidders. Two interest groups need to be satisfied: the government and the existing shareholders; whereas in the majority of cases in the US or UK, only the latter have to be persuaded. Government approval is necessary, and how difficult this will be to obtain depends on the industry in which targets operate and the standing of the target in that industry. Shareholder support is now necessary, after the reform of share structures; and as we know from the West, that support has to be bought: while there is disagreement about the gains from takeover to most stakeholders, there is unanimity that the target shareholders typically gain from the process (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Andrade et al., 2001 ).
Conclusion
The paper outlines the major legal and institutional changes underpinning the Chinese transition to a takeover market resembling that of the "Anglo Saxon" economies of the West, changes ranging from the establishment of a stock exchange to the refinement of a Takeover Code. From a zero base in 1990, the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP now exceeds that of Germany, and is comparable with that of Japan, but still falls well below the two leading takeover markets, the US and the UK. The takeover of companies listed on the stock exchange has grown substantially, but in relation to GDP is still far below that of the major western takeover markets.
Section 2 explores the characteristics of this emerging takeover market. First, it follows literature for the US and UK testing for a disciplinary role for Chinese takeover: as in the West, no strong evidence is found that a dominant role for takeover has been to discipline under-performing management.
Theories from the western literature and idiosyncratic features of the Chinese market are advanced to explain this result.
In the Chinese case, however, disciplinary or rescue takeovers have been effected, but -similar to recent bank rescues in the West -led by the state rather than the market. In our period and (listed) population the majority of takeover activity was state-led. The state's power was reinforced by the structure of shareholding, the rules on valuation, and pyramid structures of control.
The old valuation rules are being dismantled, so different shareholders will no longer have unequal rights. But, for example, provisions still exist to exempt bidders from making a general offer: this facilitates state-led takeover, but at the expense of private shareholders.
State-led takeover has been used to rescue distressed companies, replace insolvent shareholders, restructure a major industry (e.g. electrical power), and privatise firms.
As in any takeover market there are potential conflicts of interest between different shareholder 28 groups. In the Chinese case, the interests of minority shareholders have tended to be secondary to those of the (often state) majority, and this has led to relatively low valuations of shares and provided potential opportunities to "freeze out". The traditional conflict between target managers and shareholders has had a resolution closer to the UK than to the US model, with less freedom for target managers to frustrate bids which they do not welcome.
The dismantling of barriers to domestic takeover has been accompanied by a policy regime increasingly favourable to takeover of domestic companies by foreign firms; but so far this has resulted in little inward takeover investment. Analysis of failed and successful bids by foreigners suggests that parts of the Chinese listed company population are now accessible to foreign bidders, provided that the deal is consistent with national industrial policy objectives and that sufficient premium is paid. Transfer Total  1997  1  1  1998  2  2  1999  0  0  2000  1  0  1  2001  0  5  5  2002  5  7  1  13  2003  3  8  5  1  17  2004  5  10  14  1  30  2005  2  5  7  0  14   Total  10  32  38  3  83 12.05% 38.55% 45.78% 3.61% 100%
Note: here takeovers with absolute control refer to the cases in which LCs are targets and remain listed after takeover and the acquirers obtained at least 50% of their ownership. Source: own calculation, using the financial accounts of individual targets Table 5 The pre-takeover median matching firm adjusted profitability and cash flow returns of the Note:
Here the performance for 80 targets is examined. For these targets, more than 50% ownership was acquired by bidders in the period between 2000 and 2005. The following definitions for operating performance measures are used: Profitability = Pretax total profit/average net assets; Cash flow returns = Operating cash flow/average net assets; Net assets are defined as total assets minus current liabilities (Meeks, 1977:p.79 ); Pretax profit is defined as total profit after depreciation, but before tax (Meeks, 1977:p.78) ; Operating cash flow is defined as sales minus cost of goods sold, minus selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and goodwill expenses (Healy et al., 1992:p.139 ). The performance measure in this table is then expressed as a difference between the measure for a company in the takeover population and the respective matching company: a comparable listed company matched by industry (Datastream definition) and size (net assets). 
